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ASHCROFT V. AL-KIDD:  
TROUBLING DEVELOPMENTS  
IN POST-9/11 FOURTH  
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
David Doeling* 
In March 2003, FBI agents pretextually arrested Abdullah al-Kidd 
under the federal material witness statute. As a result, al-Kidd brought 
a Bivens action in federal district court against U.S. Attorney General 
John Ashcroft. The court denied Ashcroft’s assertions of absolute and 
qualified immunity, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed. In Aschroft v. al-Kidd the U.S. Supreme Court correctly held 
that qualified immunity protected Ashcroft against al-Kidd’s lawsuit. 
But the Court’s unnecessary conclusion that Ashcroft did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment is troubling. Not only did the Court expand the 
“objectively reasonable” test that is typically applied to law 
enforcement officers in the field but it also proposed a definition of 
“suspicion” that is at odds with its own precedent. The combined effect 
of these developments is an alarming ability on the part of authorities to 
avoid the probable cause requirement for arrest warrants. When an 
arresting authority’s state of mind is shielded from constitutional 
scrutiny, and when the definition of suspicion is as broad as the Court 
has construed it, the result is the erosion of basic Fourth Amendment 
protections. 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Loyola Law School Los Angeles. I thank Professor Samuel 
Pillsbury, Jay Strozdas, and Joshua Rich for their invaluable comments and criticism. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In March 2003, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents 
arrested Abdullah al-Kidd under the federal material witness statute.
1
 
Al-Kidd brought suit against U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft, 
alleging that Ashcroft used the statute as a pretext for detaining 
suspected terrorists.
2
 Ashcroft asserted qualified and absolute 
immunity.
3
 In Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
Ashcroft was protected by qualified immunity, thus overturning the 
decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
4
 The 
Court emphasized that Supreme Court precedent, particularly Whren 
v. United States,
5
 shows that the Court only considers that which is 
objectively reasonable—not subjective intentions—when applying 
the Fourth Amendment.
6
 As Ashcroft’s actions were objectively 
reasonable under the material witness statute, he did not violate al-
Kidd’s Fourth Amendment rights and thus was protected by qualified 
immunity against al-Kidd’s claims.
7
 
Despite its apparently uncontroversial holding, al-Kidd may 
have far-reaching, detrimental consequences for Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. Although the Court was correct in emphasizing that 
Whren and similar cases refused to consider the subjective intentions 
of law enforcement officers,
8
 the Court failed to consider the 
particular factual contexts in which those cases arose. Each of the 
Supreme Court cases that emphasized the irrelevancy of subjective 
intentions involved law enforcement officers who conducted 
warrantless searches and seizures.
9
 In contrast, al-Kidd involved a 
 
 1. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2079 (2011). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 2085. 
 5. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
 6. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083. 
 7. Id. 
 8. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47 (2000); Whren, 517 U.S. at 814; Scott 
v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978). 
 9. E.g., Edmond, 531 U.S. at 34–35 (discussing warrantless vehicular checkpoint searches); 
Whren, 517 U.S. at 808 (discussing the temporary detention of a motorist). In Scott, government 
agents installed wiretaps pursuant to valid court authorization. 436 U.S. at 130–31. However, the 
issue in that case was whether the agents went beyond the scope of the court’s authorization by 
failing to “minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception 
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high ranking federal official who implemented a broad policy of 
preventive detentions with ostensibly valid arrest warrants.
10
 The 
Court therefore applied the factually confined holdings of Whren and 
similar cases to the factually dissimilar case of al-Kidd. 
Such an expansion of the “objectively reasonable” test is 
particularly troubling in light of the Court’s adoption of a new 
definition of “suspicion” in al-Kidd. The Court argued in a footnote 
that suspicion involves not merely suspicion of wrongdoing but 
rather suspicion of anything, including benign behavior such as 
knowledge of a crime or of a criminal defendant.
11
 When combined 
with the Court’s refusal to consider the subjective intentions of law 
enforcement officers and prosecutors alike, the result is an alarming 
ability on the part of authorities to avoid the probable cause 
requirement for arrest warrants. Now, prosecutors may pretextually 
seek arrest warrants for suspects under statutes that do not require a 
showing of wrongdoing and without providing probable cause for the 
actual reasons for the arrest warrants. 
This Comment argues that the Court’s holding in al-Kidd 
constitutes troubling new developments in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. Part II outlines the facts and procedural history of the 
case. Part III summarizes the Court’s reasoning. Part IV gives a 
historical overview of the material witness statute, with an emphasis 
on the differences in the federal government’s use of the statute 
before and after September 11, 2001. Part V argues that the Court’s 
holding in al-Kidd misapplies precedent and inappropriately expands 
the objectively reasonable test that courts use in search and seizure 
cases. Part V also discusses the Court’s new definition of suspicion, 
which, combined with the Court’s expansion of the objectively 
reasonable test, erodes the probable cause requirement for arrest 
warrants. 
 
under” the applicable statute. Id. at 130. In that sense, the issue in Scott was whether the 
government agents conducted unlawful warrantless searches. 
 10. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2079. 
 11. Id. at 2082 n.2. 
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II.  STATEMENT OF  
THE CASE 
FBI agents apprehended al-Kidd in March 2003 as he was 
checking in for a flight to Saudi Arabia.
12
 They arrested al-Kidd 
under the federal material witness statute,
13
 which authorizes judges 
to “order the arrest of [a] person” whose testimony “is material in a 
criminal proceeding . . . if it is shown that it may become 
impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena.”
14
 
Two days before al-Kidd’s arrest, federal officials had informed a 
U.S. magistrate judge that information crucial to the prosecution of 
suspected Saudi Arabian terrorist Sami Omar al-Hussayen
15
 would 
be lost if al-Kidd were to board his flight to Saudi Arabia.
16
 Federal 
officials held al-Kidd in custody for sixteen days, and although al-
Kidd remained on supervised release for fourteen months until the 
conclusion of al-Hussayen’s trial, the prosecution never called him as 
a witness.
17
 
In March 2005, al-Kidd filed a Bivens action against Ashcroft.
18
 
Al-Kidd alleged that Ashcroft used the material witness statute as a 
pretext for arresting and investigating people whom he suspected of 
having ties with terrorist organizations.
19
 Al-Kidd argued that 
because federal officials lacked sufficient evidence to charge such 
individuals with a crime, federal officials instead detained them 
under the material witness statute.
20
 According to al-Kidd, federal 
officials never intended to call him as a witness.
21
 Rather, they 
 
 12. Id. at 2079. 
 13. Id. 
 14. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006); al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2079. 
 15. Sami Omar al-Hussayen had been charged with multiple false-statement and visa-fraud 
offenses. Brief for Petitioner at 3, al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (No. 10-98). Although al-Hussayen 
indicated on his student visa application that he was entering the United States solely for the 
purpose of pursuing academic study, federal prosecutors believed that he was providing support 
to a terrorist organization in North Africa. Id. The jury acquitted him on some charges and failed 
to reach a verdict on others. Id. at 5. 
 16. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2079. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id.; see generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) 
(creating a cause of action against federal officials for injuries that were caused by violations of 
the Fourth Amendment). 
 19. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2079. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
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suspected him of ties to al-Hussayen and thus arrested him as part of 
their “pretextual detention policy.”
22
 
Ashcroft filed a motion to dismiss al-Kidd’s complaint, asserting 
absolute and qualified immunity.
23
 The U.S. District Court for the 
District of Idaho denied Ashcroft’s motion, and a divided panel of 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
24
 The Ninth Circuit held that Ashcroft 
was protected by neither absolute nor qualified immunity and that the 
Fourth Amendment disallows pretextual material witness arrests 
without probable cause of criminal wrongdoing.
25
 The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari.
26
 
III.  REASONING OF  
THE COURT 
The issue before the Court in al-Kidd was whether qualified 
immunity protected Ashcroft from a suit that arose out of al-Kidd’s 
arrest—an arrest that was lawful under the material witness statute 
but that lacked evidence of wrongdoing.
27
 The Court examined 
whether al-Kidd pled facts sufficient to satisfy the Court’s two-
pronged qualified immunity test, which looks to whether (1) the 
official violated a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) the right 
was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.
28
 
While the Court recognized that it did not need to address both 
prongs of the test in order to overturn the lower court’s decision, it 
did so nonetheless, emphasizing that when a “Court of Appeals does 
address both prongs of qualified-immunity analysis, we have 
discretion to correct errors at each step.”
29
 
The Court first looked to whether Ashcroft violated al-Kidd’s 
Fourth Amendment rights. The Fourth Amendment protects people 
from “unreasonable . . . seizures,”
30
 and an arrest is an example of 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id.; al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 981 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2074 
(2011). The Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc. al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 598 F.3d 1129 (9th Cir. 
2010), cert. granted in part, 131 S. Ct. 415 (2010). 
 25. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2079; al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 952, 970. Judge Bea dissented from the 
Ninth Circuit court’s holding. al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 981 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
 26. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2080. 
 27. Id. at 2079. 
 28. Id. at 2080 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV) (internal quotations omitted). 
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such a seizure.
31
 According to the Court, although al-Kidd conceded 
the reasonableness of using the material witness warrant for the 
purpose of securing his testimony, he challenged the reasonableness 
of using the material witness warrant for the purpose of detaining 
him as a suspected terrorist.
32
 Ultimately, the determinative issue 
was whether Ashcroft’s subjective intent should be considered in 
determining the reasonableness of his actions under the Fourth 
Amendment.
33
 
The Court emphasized that Fourth Amendment reasonableness 
is “predominately an objective inquiry.”
34
 It looks to the objective 
circumstances of the challenged action,
35
 not to the subjective intent 
of the officer.
36
 Nonetheless, the Court acknowledged that it had 
created an exception to this rule in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,
37
 
in which it held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits suspicionless 
vehicle checkpoints that are used for detecting illegal drugs.
38
 The 
Ninth Circuit, which principally relied on Edmond, interpreted the 
case to mean that an arrest violates the Fourth Amendment if law 
enforcement officers conducted it with an illicit “programmatic 
purpose,” such as general crime control.
39
 But the Court dismissed 
this interpretation, stating that Edmond only prohibits searches or 
seizures that police conduct with an illicit programmatic purpose and 
make “pursuant to a general scheme without individualized 
suspicion.”
40
 Thus, the Court held, the determining factor under 
Edmond is not “programmatic purpose” by itself, but “programmatic 
purpose” and a lack of “individualized suspicion.”
41
 Here, the Court 
stated that because a neutral U.S. magistrate judge issued a warrant 
 
 31. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207–08 
(1979) (stating that arrest qualifies as a “seizure”)). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47 (2000)). 
 35. Id. (citing Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)). 
 36. Id. at 2081 (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814 (1996)). 
 37. 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
 38. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2081 (citing Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48). The Court also briefly 
discussed special-needs and administrative-search cases, where “actual motivations” are relevant. 
Id. at 2080–81 (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001)). 
 39. See id.; al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 968–69 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 40. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2081 (quoting Edmond, 531 U.S. at 45–46). 
 41. Id. 
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based on “individualized reasons,” this was not an instance where 
officials lacked individualized suspicion.
42
 
The Court stressed that a warrant based on individualized 
suspicion affords the arrestee (here, al-Kidd) greater protection than 
he would get in the factual situations of other Court cases where the 
Court “eschew[ed] inquiries into intent.”
43
 For example, in both 
Whren
44
 and Devenpeck v. Alford
45
 the Court refused to consider the 
subjective intent of officers who undertook seizures that were 
supported by probable cause but that lacked a warrant.
46
 And in 
Terry v. Ohio
47
 and United States v. Knights
48
 the Court applied an 
objective standard to warrantless searches supported by reasonable 
suspicion.
49
 
The Court then examined whether Ashcroft’s conduct violated 
clearly established law. An official violates clearly established law if, 
at the time of the conduct, “[t]he contours of [a] right [are] 
sufficiently clear” such that a “reasonable official would have 
understood that what he is doing violates that right.”
50
 The Court 
noted that no judicial opinion has held that an objectively reasonable 
arrest that is made under the material witness statute is 
unconstitutional due to pretext.
51
 Also, the Court dismissed the Ninth 
Circuit’s argument that Ashcroft was given clear warning of the 
unconstitutionality of his actions because a footnote in a district court 
opinion stated that his actions were illegitimate.
52
 The Court 
emphasized that a district court dictum in a footnote is not 
controlling in any jurisdiction, much less in the entire nation.
53
 
Finally, the Court rebutted the Ninth Circuit’s assertions that 
 
 42. Id. at 2082. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). 
 45. 543 U.S. 146 (2004). 
 46. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2082 (citing Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153; Whren, 517 U.S. at 813). 
 47. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 48. 534 U.S. 112 (2001). 
 49. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2082 (citing Knights, 534 U.S. at 121–22; Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–
22). 
 50. Id. at 2083 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 2084. The footnote in question reads in part: “Relying on the material witness 
statute to detain people who are presumed innocent under our Constitution in order to prevent 
potential crimes is an illegitimate use of the statute.” United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 
55, 77 n.28 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 53. al-Kidd, 131 U.S. at 2084. 
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Ashcroft’s conduct violated the history and purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment, stating that courts should not “define clearly 
established law at a high level of generality.”
54
 
Accordingly, the Court concluded that Ashcroft did not violate 
clearly established law.
55
 Thus, as neither prong of the two-part 
qualified immunity test was met, the Court held that qualified 
immunity did protect Ashcroft against al-Kidd’s claims.
56
 The 
Court’s decision, which it announced in an opinion by Justice Scalia, 
was unanimous.
57
 However, Justice Kennedy, Justice Ginsburg, and 
Justice Sotomayor each filed their own concurrences.
58
 Justice 
Kennedy briefly discussed the material witness statute in light of 
Fourth Amendment warrant requirements, and he proposed judicial 
deference to national office holders for qualified immunity 
purposes.
59
 Justice Ginsburg questioned the validity of the warrant, 
and in a footnote she discussed the Court’s traditional definition of 
suspicion.
60
 Justice Sotomayor disputed the majority’s decision to 
rule on the constitutionality of Ashcroft’s actions under the Fourth 
Amendment rather than simply hold that Ashcroft did not violate 
clearly established law.
61
 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 2085. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 2078. 
 58. Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice Sotomayor joined Part I of Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion. Id. at 2085 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Breyer and Justice Sotomayor 
joined Justice Ginsburg’s opinion. Id. at 2087 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg and 
Justice Breyer joined Justice Sotomayor’s opinion. Id. at 2089 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
Justice Kagan did not take part in the decision. Id. at 2085. 
 59. Id. at 2085–87 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Lyle Denniston, A New “Kennedy Doctrine,” 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 4, 2011, 2:14 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/06/a-new-kennedy-
doctrine (discussing Justice Kennedy’s proposition that presidential cabinet members should have 
“even greater legal immunity . . . than has existed”). 
 60. Id. at 2087–89 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 61. Id. at 2089–90 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). The concurrences also seemed to call into 
question the constitutionality of the material witness statute. Justice Kennedy stated that “the 
scope of the [material witness] statute’s lawful authorization is uncertain,” and the Court’s 
holding “leaves unresolved whether the Government’s use of the Material Witness Statute in this 
case was lawful.” Id. at 2085–86 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Similarly, Justice Sotomayor stated 
that “this case does not present an occasion to address the proper scope of the material witness 
statute or its constitutionality.” Id. at 2090 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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IV.  HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
 OF THE MATERIAL  
WITNESS STATUTE 
The authority of the federal government to arrest and detain a 
witness dates back to the eighteenth century.
62
 The Federal Judiciary 
Act of 1789 granted federal courts the authority to issue “a warrant 
for the removal of the offender, [or] the witness.”
63
 The Court has 
articulated the rationale for such broad authority by emphasizing that 
the “duty to disclose knowledge of crime . . . is so vital that one 
known to be innocent may be detained . . . as a material witness.”
64
 
This rationale and authority is ultimately rooted in the English law 
that was in effect at the time of American independence, which 
provided that all British subjects owe the king their “knowledge and 
discovery.”
65
 
Consistent with this history, in 1984 Congress passed the 
material witness statute.
66
 The material witness statute authorizes 
federal courts to issue an arrest warrant for witnesses who have 
material information and who could flee if they were subpoenaed.
67
 
Prior to 9/11, the material witness statute was used almost 
exclusively by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to 
arrest illegal immigrants and secure their testimony against their 
smugglers before they left the country.
68
 According to a study by the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, the INS made 3,959 of the 4,203 
material witness arrests between October 1, 1999, and September 30, 
 
 62. Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 938–39 (9th Cir. 1971). 
 63. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789–1799) (emphasis added). 
 64. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 184 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Jackson v. 
Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 377 (1964). 
 65. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279–80 (1919) (citing Countess of Shrewsbury's 
Case, 2 How. St. Tr. 769, 778 (1612)). 
 66. Human Rights Watch & ACLU, Witness to Abuse: Human Rights Abuses Under the 
Material Witness Law Since September 11, HUM. RTS. WATCH, June 2005, at 1, 11 n.13 
[hereinafter Witness to Abuse], available at www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/materialwitnessreport.pdf. 
 67. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006). 
 68. Witness to Abuse, supra note 66, at 14; see also Donald Q. Cochran, Material Witness 
Detention in a Post-9/11 World: Mission Creep or Fresh Start? 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 7–8 
(2011) (discussing how federal witnesses were typically detained to testify in immigration offense 
prosecutions). 
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2000.
69
 In contrast, the FBI made only 24 arrests under the material 
witness statute during the same period.
70
 
After 9/11, however, the federal government began using the 
material witness statute to detain terrorism suspects as witnesses.
71
 
High government officials noted the importance and effectiveness of 
the material witness statute as a means of combating terrorism.
72
 
Ashcroft stated that “[a]ggressive detention of lawbreakers and 
material witnesses is vital to preventing, disrupting, or delaying new 
attacks.”
73
 Similarly, then- Assistant U.S. Attorney General Michael 
Chertoff emphasized that the material witness statute is an 
“important investigative tool in the war on terrorism . . . . Bear in 
mind that you get not only testimony—you get fingerprints, you get 
hair samples—so there’s all kinds of evidence you can get from a 
witness.”
74
 
This policy of “aggressive detention” that Ashcroft and Chertoff 
outlined was reflected in the number and pattern of arrests that were 
made under the material witness statute. Whereas the number of INS 
material witness arrests decreased from 3,959 in 2000 to 3,482 in 
2002, the number of FBI material witness arrests increased from 24 
in 2000 to 123 in 2002.
75
 Although the Department of Justice did not 
reveal how many of its arrestees were held in connection with 
counterterrorism investigations, a study that Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) conducted 
 
 69. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS 2000, at 16 (2002) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS 2000], available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=605. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Witness to Abuse, supra note 66, at 15–16. See generally Ricardo J. Bascuas, The 
Unconstitutionality of ‘Hold Until Cleared’: Reexamining Material Witness Detentions in the 
Wake of the September 11th Dragnet, 58 VAND. L. REV. 677, 682–95 (2005) (discussing the 
federal government’s pretextual use of the material witness statute after 9/11). 
 72. Witness to Abuse, supra note 66, at 17–19; see Laurie L. Levenson, Detention, Material 
Witnesses, and the War on Terror, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1217, 1225 (2002) (“Material witness 
laws provide the government with the perfect avenue to jail those it considers dangerous.”). 
 73. John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney Gen., Attorney General Ashcroft Outlines Foreign 
Terrorist Tracking Task Force (Oct. 31, 2001) (emphasis added), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2001/agcrisisremarks10_31.htm. 
 74. Steve Fainaru & Margot Williams, Material Witness Law Has Many in Limbo, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 24, 2002, at A1. 
 75. COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2000, supra note 69, at 16; BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 
2002, at 16 (2004), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=597. 
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reveals that, as of June 2005, the federal government had arrested at 
least 70 material witnesses in connection with such investigations.
76
 
V.  ANALYSIS 
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents,
77
 the Court 
held that a violation of a person’s Fourth Amendment rights gives 
rise to a federal cause of action against the offending government 
official.
78
 However, government officials are immune from liability 
for civil damages so long as they do not (1) violate a statutory or 
constitutional right that is (2) clearly established.
79
 In al-Kidd, 
although the Court was correct in concluding that al-Kidd’s Fourth 
Amendment right was not clearly established at the time of his arrest, 
it improperly concluded that the FBI did not violate that right. 
A.  Aschroft Did Not Violate  
Clearly Established Law 
The Court in al-Kidd properly concluded that Ashcroft did not 
violate clearly established law. The Court’s emphasis in Whren that 
“[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause 
Fourth Amendment analysis”
80
 shows that al-Kidd’s rights were not 
clearly established at the time of his arrest. As Justice Ginsburg 
acknowledged in her concurrence, “[g]iven Whren v. United 
States . . . no ‘clearly established law’ renders Ashcroft answerable 
in damages.”
81
 However, this does not mean that Ashcroft did not 
violate al-Kidd’s Fourth Amendment rights. It only means that such 
rights were not clearly established at the time of al-Kidd’s arrest. 
B.  Ashcroft Violated al-Kidd’s  
Fourth Amendment Rights 
The Court misapplied its own precedent in holding that Ashcroft 
did not violate al-Kidd’s Fourth Amendment rights. In particular, it 
removed the holdings of Whren and similar cases from their factual 
contexts and applied them to the factually dissimilar case of al-Kidd, 
 
 76. Witness to Abuse, supra note 66, at 16. 
 77. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 80. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). 
 81. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2087 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citation 
omitted). 
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thereby expanding the objectively reasonable test that is used in 
Fourth Amendment analysis. Combined with the Court’s new 
definition of suspicion, its decision erodes the probable cause 
requirement for arrest warrants. 
1.  Misapplied Precedent and  
an Expansion of the  
Objectively Reasonable Test 
Whether a government official violated a person’s constitutional 
rights is determined by the contours of the Fourth Amendment.
82
 
Typically, when it has decided whether a search or seizure is 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the Court has declined to 
consider as determinative the subjective intent of the officer.
83
 
Rather, the Court has objectively examined the circumstances of the 
challenged action.
84
 In Scott v. United States
85
 the Court stated that 
“[s]ubjective intent . . . does not make otherwise lawful conduct 
illegal or unconstitutional”
86
 and noted its own past emphasis on “the 
objective aspect of the term ‘reasonable.’”
87
 Most importantly, in 
Whren the Court held that police officers’ brief detention of a 
motorist who had committed a civil traffic violation was not made 
invalid by the officers’ intention to search the vehicle for illegal 
narcotics.
88
 The Court stressed that subjective intent is largely 
irrelevant in typical Fourth Amendment analysis and thus refused to 
consider as probative the officers’ ulterior motive in stopping the 
motor vehicle.
89
 
However, the particular language that the Court used in past 
cases suggests that application of the objectively reasonable test is 
limited. In Whren the Court stated that an officer’s subjective intent 
plays “no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment 
 
 82. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Of course, government officials can violate rights that are 
derived from other amendments to the Constitution. This Comment, however, limits its 
discussion to the Fourth Amendment. 
 83. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813. 
 84. Id. 
 85. 436 U.S. 128 (1978). 
 86. Id. at 136. 
 87. Id. at 137 (discussing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968)). 
 88. 517 U.S. at 812–13 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n.1 (1973)). 
 89. Id. 
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analysis.”
90
 Applying this language in Edmond, the Court recognized 
the general applicability of the objectively reasonable test but 
nonetheless concluded that “programmatic purposes may be relevant 
to the validity of Fourth Amendment intrusions undertaken pursuant 
to a general scheme without individualized suspicion.”
91
 In addition, 
the Court has deemed both special-needs cases and administrative-
search cases to be outside “ordinary” Fourth Amendment analysis 
such that the Court must consider the motivations of the officers who 
conducted the searches.
92
 These cases show the Court’s 
unwillingness to apply the objectively reasonable test universally to 
Fourth Amendment cases. For these reasons, the Court in al-Kidd 
attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to place al-Kidd’s case squarely 
within the Whren line of cases and qualify it for the objectively 
reasonable test. 
The Court in al-Kidd implied that an arrest that was made with a 
material witness warrant falls within the ordinary Fourth Amendment 
analysis that it had identified in Whren. It did so by stating that an 
arrest “qualifies as a ‘seizure.’”
93
 This is true, but as Justice 
Sotomayor noted in her concurrence, the Court has never considered 
whether an official’s subjective intent matters in the “novel” 
situation where officials detain an individual for a prolonged period 
“without probable cause to believe he had committed any criminal 
offense.”
94
 Also, the Court has historically applied the objectively 
reasonable test only to situations where an officer is conducting a 
warrantless search or seizure, not where an officer is arresting a 
person with an ostensibly valid warrant. For example, in Devenpeck 
the Court did not consider the intentions of officers who undertook 
the warrantless arrest of a person who was impersonating a police 
officer.
95
 Similarly, in Whren the Court refused to consider the 
 
 90. Id. at 813 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001) 
(deciding not to consider subjective intent because “our holding rests on ordinary Fourth 
Amendment analysis”). 
 91. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45–46 (2000). 
 92. E.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (special needs); 
Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 294–95 (1984) (administrative search). 
 93. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011). The Court also stated that Ashcroft’s 
case was neither a special-needs case nor an administrative-search case. Id. at 2081. 
 94. Id. at 2090 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). The fact that it is unclear whether law-
enforcement officers validly obtained the warrant makes this factual scenario even more unique. 
Id. at 2087–88 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 95. See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 149–50 (2004). 
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subjective intent of police officers who briefly detained suspects 
without a warrant during the course of a traffic stop.
96
 In both Terry 
and Knights the Court examined the objectively reasonable behavior 
of police officers who conducted warrantless searches. Al-Kidd did 
not involve an example of such warrantless arrests or searches. 
Instead, it involved Ashcroft’s policy of obtaining valid material 
witness warrants for the purpose of preventive detention. 
Most importantly, Whren and similar cases applied the 
objectively reasonable test to law enforcement officers in the field, 
not to high-ranking federal prosecutors such as the attorney general. 
Each of the cases that the Court cited in support of its refusal to 
consider the subjective intent of Ashcroft—Whren, Scott, and 
Edmond—involved the decisions of law enforcement officers in the 
field.
97
 In Whren police officers searched a vehicle,
98
 while in Scott 
government agents installed wiretaps,
99
 and in Edmond police 
officers conducted a vehicular checkpoint.
100
 The Court implicitly 
acknowledged this distinction in Devenpeck when it stated that an 
“officer’s state of mind . . . is irrelevant to the existence of probable 
cause.”
101
 
In contrast, in al-Kidd the relevant subjective intentions were not 
those of the arresting officer but rather those of Ashcroft, the 
attorney general. In making the objectively reasonable test applicable 
to high-ranking federal officials, the Court signaled its intent not to 
question the motives behind potentially far-reaching prosecutorial 
decisions. Thus, the Court extended the applicability of the 
objectively reasonable test beyond the individual decisions of law 
enforcement officers and agents to the broad policies of federal 
policy makers—an obvious example of which is the federal 
government’s national policy of detaining terrorist suspects under the 
material witness statute. 
 
 96. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808–09 (1996). 
 97. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 34–35 (2000); Whren, 517 U.S. at 808–09; 
Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 131–32 (1978). 
 98. Whren, 517 U.S. at 808–09. 
 99. Scott, 436 U.S. at 131–32. 
 100. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 34–35. 
 101. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (emphasis added). 
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2.  A New Definition of Suspicion  
and an Erosion of the Probable Cause  
Requirement for Arrest Warrants 
The consequence of expanding the objectively reasonable test is 
particularly alarming when it is considered in conjunction with the 
Court’s new definition of suspicion. In discussing the warrant that 
federal officials used in al-Kidd, the Court emphasized that a warrant 
that is based on individualized suspicion affords arrestees significant 
protection.
102
 In footnote two of its decision, the Court provided a 
definition of such suspicion.
103
 According to the Court, suspicion in 
the context of the Fourth Amendment does not mean suspicion of 
“wrongdoing.”
104
 Rather, the Court stated that the “common and 
idiomatic” use of the word suspicion means suspicion of anything, 
such as “I have a suspicion she is throwing me a surprise birthday 
party.”
105
 
As Justice Ginsburg argued in her concurrence,
106
 the term 
“suspicion” in “legal argot” is not susceptible to this definition
107
 
because suspicion means “individualized suspicion of 
wrongdoing.”
108
 In O’Connor v. Ortega,
109
 for example, the Court 
discussed the individualized suspicion of misconduct by the person 
whose offices were searched by police.
110
 In New Jersey v. T.L.O.
111
 
the Court noted that a search of a student’s purse was based on 
suspicion that she had violated school rules.
112
 And in Michigan v. 
Summers,
113
 while discussing exceptions to the probable cause 
requirement, the Court emphasized that police must have “an 
articulable basis for suspecting criminal activity.”
114
 
The Court’s refusal in al-Kidd to accept the traditional definition 
of suspicion does not bode well for the probable cause requirement 
 
 102. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2082 (2011). 
 103. Id. at 2082 n.2. 
 104. Id. at 2082. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 2088–89 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 2088 n.3 (quoting Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000)). 
 109. 480 U.S. 709 (1987). 
 110. Id. at 726. 
 111. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
 112. Id. at 342 n.8. 
 113. 452 U.S. 692 (1981). 
 114. Id. at 699 (emphasis added). 
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for arrest warrants. The language that the Court used seems to 
explicitly sanction warrants, such as the material witness warrant, 
that are not supported by suspicion of wrongdoing but suspicion of 
whatever a federal or state statute identifies as a permissible reason 
for arrest. This alone may not be alarming because the federal 
government’s authority to arrest material witnesses has been in effect 
since the nation’s founding. Yet when the Court’s definition of 
suspicion is combined with the Court’s refusal to consider the 
subjective intentions of prosecutors and policy makers, its decision 
allows officials to avoid the probable cause requirement for arrest 
warrants. As long as officials have probable cause to believe that a 
suspect qualifies for arrest under a state or federal statute—which, in 
light of the Court’s opinion, need not require wrongdoing—they may 
obtain an arrest warrant despite the fact that they lack probable cause 
for that which the suspect is actually suspected of and arrested for.
115
 
Al-Kidd provides an example of this. Although Ashcroft had 
probable cause to believe that al-Kidd had material information that 
was necessary for the trial of al-Hussayen, al-Kidd was actually 
arrested as a suspected terrorist, for which Ashcroft lacked probable 
cause.
116
 As the Ninth Circuit emphasized in its decision, although 
al-Kidd was named in the warrant, the result is nonetheless the same 
as that of a general warrant and its inherent disregard of 
individualized probable cause—“gutting the substantive protections 
of the Fourth Amendment’s ‘probable cause’ requirement and giving 
the state the power to arrest upon the executive’s mere suspicion.”
117
 
The federal government’s use of the material witness statute 
after 9/11 further highlights these concerns. As the study by HRW 
and the ACLU shows, between September 11, 2001, and June 2005, 
at least seventy suspects were detained in connection with 
counterterrorist investigations under the material witness statute.
118
 
Although the government presumably provided probable cause to 
believe that such suspects were material witnesses, it did not provide 
probable cause to believe that they committed illegal terrorist 
activities. Thus, the government arrested more than seventy people 
 
 115. See generally Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 941–43 (9th Cir. 1971) (discussing 
the probable cause requirement in the context of the material witness statute). 
 116. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2079 (2011). 
 117. al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 972 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011). 
 118. Witness to Abuse, supra note 66, at 16. 
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without providing probable cause for the true reason for which they 
were arrested (i.e., wrongdoing). Such a systematic avoidance of the 
probable cause requirement for arrest warrants is far more alarming 
than the relatively isolated incidents in Whren and similar cases are. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Although the al-Kidd Court was correct in holding that Ashcroft 
did not violate a clearly established law, its conclusion that Ashcroft 
did not violate al-Kidd’s Fourth Amendment rights will have 
detrimental consequences for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
Among other statements, the Court’s emphasis in Whren that 
subjective intent plays “no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth 
Amendment analysis”
119
 forecloses the assertion that al-Kidd’s rights 
were clearly established at the time of his arrest. Although the Court 
could have ended its inquiry at this point, it further analyzed whether 
Ashcroft violated al-Kidd’s rights, clearly established or not. It is this 
analysis that makes the opinion far more wide reaching—and 
detrimentally so—than was originally necessary. The opinion 
constitutes a significant expansion of the objectively reasonable 
standard for determining Fourth Amendment violations, and, when it 
is combined with the Court’s definition of suspicion, it creates a 
potentially severe erosion of the probable cause requirement for 
arrest warrants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 119. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (emphasis added). 
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